jcv-dev
551b42eab5
Close the gaps between the documented contract (API-STANDARD, TENANCY, ENTITLEMENTS) and the implementation, and remove committed build artifacts. Security: - verify + process inbound webhooks (HMAC/handler verify, size limit, timestamp tolerance, idempotency via InboundEvent.external_id) - real 2FA login flow (pre-auth challenge; tokens only after verify/recovery) - wire HybridPermission into security/audit views; add API-key rotate and users/<id>/permissions|roles endpoints - tenant-scoped throttling on by default; webhook replay protection - verify MercadoPago webhook signatures - login brute-force guard, configurable password policy, real ALTCHA PoW Correctness: - apply verified billing webhooks idempotently (subscription/entitlement/ invoice/PaymentTransaction); scheduled payment lifecycle jobs - capture audit update diffs automatically; add audit retention purge - working notification retries, per-channel rate limits, log retention - pluggable virus scanner, upload-size limit, pipeline toggle - feature rollout %/environment targeting; settings-driven registrations - workflow guards (instance cap, route depth, self-assignment, clone on re-entry) - wire every previously-dead INFRASYNTH_* setting; drop truly dead ones Delivery: - README + CHANGELOG; CI format check + coverage gate - keep test media out of the tree; untrack .coverage, __pycache__, egg-info, docs/ and invoice artifacts
35 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
35 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
import hmac
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import time
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def _algorithm() -> str:
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from infrasynth.shared.settings_utils import get_setting
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return str(get_setting("INFRASYNTH_WEBHOOKS", "SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM", "sha256"))
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def sign_payload(secret: str, payload: str, timestamp: int | None = None) -> str:
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ts = timestamp or int(time.time())
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message = f"{ts}.{payload}".encode()
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digest = hmac.new(secret.encode(), message, _algorithm()).hexdigest()
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return f"t={ts},v1={digest}"
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def verify_signature(secret: str, payload: str, signature_header: str, tolerance_seconds: int = 300) -> bool:
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try:
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parts = signature_header.split(",")
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ts_part = parts[0]
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sig_part = parts[1]
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ts = int(ts_part.split("=")[1])
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sig = sig_part.split("=")[1]
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except (IndexError, ValueError, AttributeError):
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return False
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now = int(time.time())
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if abs(now - ts) > tolerance_seconds:
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return False
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expected = sign_payload(secret, payload, timestamp=ts)
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expected_sig = expected.split(",")[1].split("=")[1]
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return hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected_sig)
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