jcv-dev
551b42eab5
Close the gaps between the documented contract (API-STANDARD, TENANCY, ENTITLEMENTS) and the implementation, and remove committed build artifacts. Security: - verify + process inbound webhooks (HMAC/handler verify, size limit, timestamp tolerance, idempotency via InboundEvent.external_id) - real 2FA login flow (pre-auth challenge; tokens only after verify/recovery) - wire HybridPermission into security/audit views; add API-key rotate and users/<id>/permissions|roles endpoints - tenant-scoped throttling on by default; webhook replay protection - verify MercadoPago webhook signatures - login brute-force guard, configurable password policy, real ALTCHA PoW Correctness: - apply verified billing webhooks idempotently (subscription/entitlement/ invoice/PaymentTransaction); scheduled payment lifecycle jobs - capture audit update diffs automatically; add audit retention purge - working notification retries, per-channel rate limits, log retention - pluggable virus scanner, upload-size limit, pipeline toggle - feature rollout %/environment targeting; settings-driven registrations - workflow guards (instance cap, route depth, self-assignment, clone on re-entry) - wire every previously-dead INFRASYNTH_* setting; drop truly dead ones Delivery: - README + CHANGELOG; CI format check + coverage gate - keep test media out of the tree; untrack .coverage, __pycache__, egg-info, docs/ and invoice artifacts
82 lines
3.2 KiB
Python
82 lines
3.2 KiB
Python
"""Login brute-force protection (``INFRASYNTH_SECURITY``).
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Two layers, both cache-backed and tenant-prefix-free by necessity (they run
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before a tenant is known, so they key on IP + credential, never on tenant data):
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* a short per-credential/IP rate limit (``LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT``, e.g. ``10/m``);
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* an IP blacklist that trips after ``IP_BLACKLIST_THRESHOLD`` failures inside
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``IP_BLACKLIST_WINDOW_MINUTES`` and blocks the IP for the same window.
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Failures are recorded on any rejected login and cleared on success. A blacklisted
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IP gets ``429 RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED`` with a ``Retry-After`` hint.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import time
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from django.core.cache import cache
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from infrasynth.shared.exceptions import RateLimitError
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from infrasynth.shared.settings_utils import get_setting
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__all__ = ["LoginAttemptGuard"]
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def _parse_rate(rate: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
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"""Parses ``"10/m"`` into ``(count, seconds)``. Defaults to 10/minute."""
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try:
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count_part, period = rate.split("/", 1)
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count = int(count_part)
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except (ValueError, AttributeError):
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return 10, 60
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seconds = {"s": 1, "m": 60, "h": 3600, "d": 86400}.get(period.strip().lower(), 60)
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return count, seconds
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class LoginAttemptGuard:
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def __init__(self) -> None:
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self.rate_count, self.rate_window = _parse_rate(get_setting("INFRASYNTH_SECURITY", "LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT", "10/m"))
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self.blacklist_threshold = int(get_setting("INFRASYNTH_SECURITY", "IP_BLACKLIST_THRESHOLD", 100))
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self.blacklist_window = int(get_setting("INFRASYNTH_SECURITY", "IP_BLACKLIST_WINDOW_MINUTES", 15)) * 60
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@staticmethod
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def _ip(request) -> str:
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return request.META.get("REMOTE_ADDR", "") or "unknown"
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def _blacklist_key(self, ip: str) -> str:
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return f"login:blacklist:{ip}"
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def _failure_key(self, ip: str, credential: str) -> str:
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return f"login:fail:{ip}:{credential}"
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def check(self, request, credential: str) -> None:
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"""Raises :class:`RateLimitError` when the attempt must be rejected."""
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ip = self._ip(request)
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if cache.get(self._blacklist_key(ip)):
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raise RateLimitError(
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"Too many failed login attempts from this address.",
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code="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
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details=[{"field": "ip", "issue": "blacklisted"}],
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)
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count = cache.get(self._failure_key(ip, credential), 0)
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if count >= self.rate_count:
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raise RateLimitError(
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"Too many failed login attempts.",
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code="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
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details=[{"field": "credential", "issue": "rate_limited"}],
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)
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def record_failure(self, request, credential: str) -> None:
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ip = self._ip(request)
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key = self._failure_key(ip, credential)
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try:
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count = cache.incr(key)
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except ValueError:
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cache.set(key, 1, self.rate_window)
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count = 1
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if count >= self.blacklist_threshold:
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cache.set(self._blacklist_key(ip), time.time(), self.blacklist_window)
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def clear(self, request, credential: str) -> None:
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cache.delete(self._failure_key(self._ip(request), credential))
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