jcv-dev
551b42eab5
Close the gaps between the documented contract (API-STANDARD, TENANCY, ENTITLEMENTS) and the implementation, and remove committed build artifacts. Security: - verify + process inbound webhooks (HMAC/handler verify, size limit, timestamp tolerance, idempotency via InboundEvent.external_id) - real 2FA login flow (pre-auth challenge; tokens only after verify/recovery) - wire HybridPermission into security/audit views; add API-key rotate and users/<id>/permissions|roles endpoints - tenant-scoped throttling on by default; webhook replay protection - verify MercadoPago webhook signatures - login brute-force guard, configurable password policy, real ALTCHA PoW Correctness: - apply verified billing webhooks idempotently (subscription/entitlement/ invoice/PaymentTransaction); scheduled payment lifecycle jobs - capture audit update diffs automatically; add audit retention purge - working notification retries, per-channel rate limits, log retention - pluggable virus scanner, upload-size limit, pipeline toggle - feature rollout %/environment targeting; settings-driven registrations - workflow guards (instance cap, route depth, self-assignment, clone on re-entry) - wire every previously-dead INFRASYNTH_* setting; drop truly dead ones Delivery: - README + CHANGELOG; CI format check + coverage gate - keep test media out of the tree; untrack .coverage, __pycache__, egg-info, docs/ and invoice artifacts
53 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
53 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
"""Enforces 2FA for session-authenticated users.
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Bearer/cookie JWT requests never reach this check: an access token is only ever
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minted *after* the second factor succeeds (see ``security.views``), so holding a
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minted token is proof the factor was completed. This middleware therefore guards
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the session-authenticated surface (Django admin and any session-based view).
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"""
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from django.http import JsonResponse
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from django.shortcuts import redirect
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from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin
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from ..models import TwoFactorConfig
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class TwoFactorMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin):
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EXEMPT_PATHS = [
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"/api/v1/auth/login/",
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"/api/v1/auth/logout/",
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"/api/v1/auth/2fa/setup/",
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"/api/v1/auth/2fa/verify-setup/",
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"/api/v1/auth/2fa/verify/",
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"/api/v1/auth/2fa/recovery/",
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"/api/v1/auth/check/",
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]
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def process_request(self, request):
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if not hasattr(request, "user") or not request.user.is_authenticated:
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return None
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# A minted JWT proves the second factor already happened.
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if getattr(request, "auth", None) is not None:
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return None
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if request.path in self.EXEMPT_PATHS or request.path.startswith("/admin/"):
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return None
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session = getattr(request, "session", None)
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if session is not None and session.get("_2fa_verified"):
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return None
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try:
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tfa = TwoFactorConfig.objects.get(user=request.user)
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except TwoFactorConfig.DoesNotExist:
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return None
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if not (tfa.is_enabled and tfa.is_configured):
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return None
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if request.path.startswith("/api/"):
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return JsonResponse(
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{
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"code": "AUTH_2FA_REQUIRED",
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"message": "Second-factor verification is required.",
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"details": [],
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},
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status=403,
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)
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return redirect("2fa-verify")
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