Close the remaining places where an extension point was hardcoded, and expose a stable public import surface for every app. - files: register_storage_backend(...) / STORAGE_BACKENDS[name]["CLASS"]; unknown backends now fail loudly instead of silently using local - files: PipelineStepRegistry + @pipeline_step; PIPELINE_EXECUTOR setting - billing: INVOICE_PDF_BUILDER setting - security: TWO_FACTOR_SERVICE / TWO_FACTOR_RECOVERY_SERVICE settings - all app packages expose lazy public exports (PEP 562); infrasynth.shared re-exports its primitives eagerly - README documents the per-module extension-point table - tests/test_extensibility.py pins each hook plus the public surface
84 lines
4.9 KiB
Markdown
84 lines
4.9 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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All notable changes to `infrasynth-base` are documented here.
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The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
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and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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Versions are derived from Conventional Commits by `python-semantic-release`; do
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not hand-pick a version (see `../AGENTS.backend-packages.md` §8).
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## [Unreleased]
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### Added
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- **Uniform extensibility across every module.** Storage backends can be
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registered (`register_storage_backend` or `STORAGE_BACKENDS[name]["CLASS"]`),
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pipeline steps via `PipelineStepRegistry`/`@pipeline_step`, the pipeline
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executor via `PIPELINE_EXECUTOR`, the invoice PDF via `INVOICE_PDF_BUILDER`,
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and the 2FA method via `TWO_FACTOR_SERVICE`/`TWO_FACTOR_RECOVERY_SERVICE` — all
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through settings/registries, with no kit edits. The other modules already
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resolved extensions through dotted paths (gateways, channels, tasks, inbound
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handlers, scanner) and are now documented as such.
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- **Lazy public API per app package.** `from infrasynth.security import
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AuthorizationService`, `from infrasynth.billing import EntitlementService`,
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etc. resolve via PEP 562 without importing models before the app registry is
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ready; `infrasynth.shared` re-exports its primitives eagerly.
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- **Composable per-endpoint gates** (`infrasynth.gates`): declare
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`infrasynth_gates = [...]` (and/or `@gated(...)` on a viewset action) with
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`TwoFactorGate`, `AltchaGate`, `EntitlementGate`, `FeatureGate`,
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`PermissionGate`, or a custom `Gate`. Access is evaluated per endpoint, the
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default is "gate nothing", and denials raise the correct namespaced error
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(`AUTH_2FA_REQUIRED`, `ENTITLEMENT_PLAN_UPGRADE_REQUIRED`,
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`VALIDATION_ALTCHA_REQUIRED`, …). `GatePermission` is a default permission
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class and the kit's `HybridPermission` evaluates declared gates too.
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- **`2fa` JWT claim** minted only after successful verification and preserved
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across workspace selection, so `TwoFactorGate` works for multi-workspace users.
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- **Verified inbound webhooks.** `InboundReceiveView` now enforces the shared
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HMAC signature (or a provider-specific `BaseInboundHandler.verify`), payload
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size limits, timestamp tolerance, and idempotent re-delivery via
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`InboundEvent.external_id`; verified events are dispatched to the endpoint's
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handler through `process_inbound_event` and marked `is_verified`/`is_processed`.
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- **Working 2FA login flow.** Login now challenges users with a configured
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second factor (pre-auth session + cookie) and only mints JWT cookies after
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`2fa/verify/` (or `2fa/recovery/`) succeeds; `TwoFactorMiddleware` guards the
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session-authenticated surface.
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- **Permission enforcement.** `HybridPermission` / `require_permission` are now
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wired into security and audit viewsets with documented codenames and a
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tenant-owner bypass; `HybridPermission` takes tenant ownership into account.
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- **API-key rotation** (`/api/v1/auth/api-keys/<id>/rotate/`) and
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**user permission/role endpoints** (`/api/v1/auth/users/<id>/permissions/`,
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`/users/<id>/roles/`).
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- **Billing webhook processing.** Verified events are applied idempotently to
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subscriptions, entitlements, invoices, and `PaymentTransaction` rows; replay
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protection via `assert_fresh_webhook`.
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- **Scheduled billing lifecycle** (`sync_subscriptions`,
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`advance_entitlement_lifecycle`, `expire_entitlements`,
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`generate_renewal_invoices`) and **notification retries** + log retention, all
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wired into `CELERY_BEAT_SCHEDULE`.
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- **Audit update diffs** are captured automatically via a `pre_save` snapshot;
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**audit retention purge** task added.
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- **Feature rollout** (`rollout_percentage`, `environments`,
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`ROLLOUT_HASH_ALGORITHM`) and settings-driven flag registration.
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- **Login brute-force guard** (per-credential rate limit + IP blacklist),
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**configurable password policy** (`PasswordPolicyValidator`), and a correctly
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enforced **ALTCHA** proof-of-work.
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- **File hardening:** global upload-size limit, processing-pipeline toggle, and
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a pluggable virus scanner (`noop`/`clamav`/custom) with `REQUIRE_VIRUS_SCAN`.
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- **Workflow guards:** `MAX_INSTANCES_PER_WORKFLOW`, `ROUTE_MAX_DEPTH`,
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`ALLOW_SELF_ASSIGNMENT`, `AUTO_CLONE_ASSIGNEES_ON_REENTRY`.
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- **MercadoPago** webhook signature verification.
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- `README.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`, and a CI format/coverage gate.
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### Changed
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- `TenantRateThrottle` and `RateLimitHeadersMiddleware` are active by default,
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producing `X-RateLimit-*` headers on API responses.
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- `EntitlementService` treats `past_due` as within grace (entitled) and merges
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entitlement-level feature overrides over `plan.features`; `require_limit`
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raises `ENTITLEMENT_LIMIT_REACHED`.
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- `FeatureService` resolves the current tenant automatically and honors rollout
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and environment targeting.
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### Fixed
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- API-key authentication no longer leaks tenant context.
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- `EventRegistry.emit` no longer uses `__import__` and honors
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`DELIVERY_BACKEND`.
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- Test media artifacts no longer accumulate in the repository tree.
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